Since its inception, the European Union was conceptualised as (and prided itself on being) a distinctly ‘different’ type of international actor. Over the decades, it has been described as a ‘civilian’ (Dûchene, 1973, p.19), a ‘soft’ (Hill, 1990) and most recently a ‘normative’ power in international relations (Manners, 2002, 2006). The EU’s official texts make similar claims about the Union’s role in world politics. Since the 1970s, in fact, norms and values began permeating European foreign policy documents and declarations (see Hill & Smith, 2000). At a two-day meeting of EU heads of state on 14-15 December 1973, which resulted in a declaration on Europe's international identity, the delegates talked about building a ‘just basis’ for international relations.

Seven years after Sept. 11, 2001, it is clear that the West’s swift and decisive reaction to the atrocities perpetrated by Al-Qaeda produced far greater confusion—both intellectual and political—than clarity. It sparked off a fierce competition among thinkers, policymakers, and politicians to articulate the definitive conceptual freeze-frame of the new era. America’s and Europe’s respective global roles were described in terms of the starkest possible dichotomies—hard power versus soft power, might versus right, unilateral versus multilateral, hegemon versus counterweight, revolutionary versus status quo, and transformational versus incremental.

The debate over missile defence in Europe is likely to remain on the political agenda for the foreseeable future as discussions evolve on both sides of the Atlantic. This policy brief provides basic background information on missile defence and highlights some of the principal political and security aspects associated with missile defence in Europe.

In every country, and at all times, we like to rely on certainty. But in a world of asymmetric threats and global challenges, our governments and peoples are uncertain about what the threats are and how they should face the complicated world before them. After explaining the complexity of the threats, the authors assess current capabilities and analyse the deficiencies in existing institutions, concluding that no nation and no institution is capable of dealing with current and future problems on its own. The only way to deal with these threats and challenges is through an integrated and allied strategic approach, which includes both non-military and military capabilities.

The President: President Ilves, Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg, distinguished guests: Laura and I are pleased to be back in Prague, and we appreciate the gracious welcome in this historic hall. Tomorrow I attend the G-8 Summit, where I will meet with the leaders of the world's most powerful economies. This afternoon, I stand with men and women who represent an even greater power -- the power of human conscience.

This monograph provides a set of recommendations to the United States, NATO allies, and EU institutions in promoting a more consequential Eastern Dimension. Above all, the U.S. administration needs to clearly make the argument that progress toward stable states and secure democracies in a widening Europe and an expanding trans-Atlantic community that encompasses the Black Sea zone is in America’s national interests and serves its strategic goals. The eventual inclusion of all East European states that are currently situated outside NATO and the creation of a wider Alliance would help expand and consolidate democratic systems, open up new markets, stabilize Washington’s new allies, and increase the number of potential U.S. partners.

The United States has been a constant, if at times ambivalent, supporter of European integration from the earliest days of the European Coal and Steel Community to the current European Union.

With Angela Merkel as chancellor of Germany, Nicolas Sarkozy as president of France, and Gordon Brown as prime minister of the United Kingdom, the European leaders most closely identified with the transatlantic rift over Iraq—Gerhard Schröder, Jacques Chirac, and Tony Blair—have left office. All three new leaders have announced a new tone of pragmatic cooperation with the United States, raising the prospects for a revitalized transatlantic relationship. What do these changes in leadership promise for U.S.–European cooperation? Although relations have demonstrably improved at the official level across the Atlantic, what public opinion landscape will these new leaders inherit? Are the European publics prepared to support closer relations ahead of the 2008 U.S. presidential elections? How supportive is public opinion of closer cooperation on issues that have remained contentious between the United States and Europe?

I do not think I knew the full meaning of the word "surreal" until I took my family for a vacation in the idyllic Italian hill town of Spello, Umbria, this summer. We lived inside the medieval walls and spent much of the time just sitting on our balcony or in terraced cafés, planning the next meal. Church bells rang frequently, men sat and played cards, old women hobbled up the street carrying the daily groceries, little kids played under the chestnut trees. It was easy to fit into this unhurried, peaceful way of life.

Washington's holiday from strategic debates is over. In the years immediately after September 11th, feelings of solidarity with a president at war prevented serious discussions on the merits of US foreign policy. But now the Iraq debacle has ended all that, and few argue that the country is on the right course. The current debates on America's role in the world could lead to a profound change in the direction of US foreign policy. This is a country that has to learn from its own mistakes, but once it does, it tends to apply the lessons learned with a vengeance. The history of America is replete with examples of dramatic reversals. Think of the switch from Wilsonian idealism in the 1910s to isolationism in the 1930s to Truman's post-war internationalism.

The unease with the current state of affairs in the Alliance is palpable. However, it is unlikely that NATO will respond to this unease without significant change in the strategic landscape. A more realistic approach for moving NATO forward must first of all acknowledge that the transatlantic security consensus post-“9/11” is, at best, incomplete and, at worst, in disarray. One of the contributing factors is disagreement within the Euro-Atlantic community over the appropriate role of the EU as an autonomous security actor. Despite this lack of consensus in specific areas, there is no reason why NATO should not search for a new “grand bargain”, either in the form of a new document or through new initiatives.

Today, the United States and its European allies find themselves divided over several international legal issues. While European governments have championed many treaties, including the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines and the Kyoto accord on climate change, the United States has remained a skeptic, questioning the effectiveness of these treaties and the restrictions they might place on U.S. sovereignty. These differences predate the recent U.S.-European tensions over Iraq, and they persist despite the improvement in transatlantic relations overall. Discord over the rendition of suspected terrorists and the prison at Guantanamo has been especially sharp and public, but discord over other legal matters — from the International Criminal Court to pre-emption in cases of WMD — has continued to fester.

The remarkable evolution of the European Union after the Cold War raises crucial questions for the United States. What role will the EU play, and how will its actions aff ect U.S. interests? Some observers think the EU is becoming a superpower that will dominate the United States. Others say the EU has already reached its zenith; that economic and demographic trends will cause it to fall behind the United States, China and India in the coming decades.

The U.S. Congress and successive U.S. administrations have supported the European Union (EU) and the process of European integration as ways to foster a stable Europe, democratic states, and strong trading partners. In recent years, a number of trade and foreign policy conflicts have strained the U.S.-EU relationship. Since the divisive dispute over Iraq in 2003, however, both the United States and the EU have sought to improve cooperation and demonstrate a renewed commitment to partnership in tackling global challenges. This report evaluates current issues in the U.S.-EU relationship ahead of the annual U.S.-EU summit on April 30, 2007, in Washington, DC. It will be updated as events warrant. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick, and CRS Report RL30732, Trade Conflict and U.S.-European Union Economic Relationship, by Raymond Ahearn.

These are the results of a representative survey carried out by the Bertelsmann Foundation on the eve of the EU-US summit to be held on 30 April. The results also provide the basis for discussions in the "Brussels Forum", a high-powered transatlantic strategy forum hosted by the Bertelsmann Foundation together with the German Marshall Fund, Daimler-Chrysler and other partners from 27 to 29 April in Brussels. The results reflect an interest in placing transatlantic relations on a new footing. The period of reflection on the state of relations following the discord over the Iraq conflict has been replaced with a pragmatic rapprochement. People are now less inclined to take this relationship for granted and are mapping out specific areas for possible cooperation.

Lately Americans have had to recognize the power of Europe - often for its bite. It was Old Europe that sniped about the war in Iraq, while regulators in Brussels have derailed U.S. mega-mergers and taken on Microsoft. But now an overstretched Washington is expressing its hunger for a strong and unified Europe that it can work with, many leading public figures in the United States say.

Here is a controversial proposition: we are witnessing an important and welcome about-turn in US foreign policy. Now an incendiary suggestion: instead of gloating, or carping about too little too late, Europe should act to reinforce the shift. Better still, America’s allies could also address the shortcomings in their own responses to the present global disorder.

On May 1, 2004, ten new countries, with a com¬bined population of 74 million, became members of the European Union, bringing the total E.U. popula¬tion to 454 million. This means that the E.U. now has a population more than 50 percent larger than that of the United States. And with Romania and Bulgaria joining on January 1, 2007, another 30 million will take that to 484 million.

We’re here today and at this time to talk about the European Union and its relationship with the United States. In the wake of the French and Dutch referenda rejecting the EU Constitution, it is certainly the right time for us to be having this discussion. Whether or not the EU is in a crisis right now is the subject of considerable debate. Those that support further integration maintain that the collapse of the constitutional process is merely temporary, that it can be resurrected in some time and form, when cooler heads have prevailed. The opposition to the Constitution in this view, was not directed at the EU per se, but against unpopular national leaders who supported the Constitution. I disagree with this contention, perhaps because I do have faith in the European people and their democratic rights to express themselves. But I believe that those voters in France and the Netherlands who had the opportunity to express their views on this subject represented millions of Europeans who did not, whose governments or parliaments made the decisions for them, about this Constitution.

Engagement and multilateralism have become mantra for European diplomats and policymakers. There is seldom a problem, they believe, that cannot be solved by dialogue. On April 26, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine and five former European foreign ministers signed a letter decrying the possibility of military force against Iran and instead arguing for direct negotiation. “Every European member of our group has met with influential Iranian officials during the past few months and found a widespread interest among them in conducting a broad discussion with the United States on security issues,” they wrote.

The governments of the United States and Western Europe collaborated successfully for many decades during the Cold War, but they now often disagree and oppose each other on important matters of policy and strategy. Beyond the government ministries, European and American economies and cultures seem to be growing apart as well. But Atlanticism nonetheless has a future--Americans and Europeans will continue to collaborate closely despite our differences and disagreements. We will do so not so much because we share a common heritage but because we face common problems today which are rooted in our heritage. These are the problems of societies that are rich and comfortable, pluralist and democratic, highly mobile, and technologically adept. Such problems exist in other places as well but they are most pronounced in Western Europe and North America, the homelands of prosperous liberal civilization. It has fallen to us to cope with these problems--successfully or unsuccessfully, with happy or unhappy consequences not only for ourselves but for the rest of the world.

Is the expanded "super NATO" America's greatest strategic ally, or is it in reality a hollow shell, multiplying American strategic commitments without providing any significant resources to deal with them?

There is something rather surreal about the transatlantic world today. There are completely separate debates about Iraq ongoing on either side of the ocean and they simply don't connect.

On June 8, NATO faces a day of global decision, when NATO defense ministers will meet to plan the further transformation of the alliance.

After decades of denial, European countries are starting to recognize their security also would be strengthened by a missile defense. West European governments have spent years denigrating America's missile defense plans as unnecessary "star wars." But now, thanks to Iran's drive for nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles, and the support of NATO's new East European members, NATO finally is stepping up to the plate.

France is an economic success story. It is the sixth largest economy in the world, the fourth biggest exporter of services and the third largest investor abroad. All the main macroeconomic indicators have improved in the past 12 months. 2005 was a year of record profits for the forty leading French corporations. Beyond well known consumer and luxury goods companies like L’Oréal and LVMH, French companies are international leaders in sectors such as nuclear technology (Areva) and communications (Alcatel). Not bad for a country of fewer than 63 million people who do not always enjoy a reputation for hard work.

Our agenda today is truly global, and it pays tribute both to this continent’s internal success and to the strength of the transatlantic partnership. America and Europe have had disagreements, strong ones, and we are likely to have more in the future. But as befits an enterprise of historic importance, we move past these differences and unite to achieve great things, locating in our common approach a force that has altered the world.

Officers of the U.S. Armed Forces have been familiar with the inner workings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)since its inception in 1949.

Since 1989, the security environment facing the United States and its European allies has changed beyond recognition. The Soviet Union has disintegrated, as has the division of Europe between East and West, and new threats have arisen. The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s demonstrated that instability and war emerging from failing states could affect the peace and security of Europe. After 2001, global terrorism became the priority threat, especially when linked with the prospect of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Ukrainian foreign policy until 2005 could be described as ambiguous. On the one hand the ruling elite displayed a clear preference for the West, and wished to integrate the country into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time, Ukraine was prevented from fully associating with the West by its considerable dependence on Russian energy and trade.

The best way to provide Israel with that additional security is to upgrade its relationship with the collective defense arm of the West: NATO.

NATO is continuing its internal transformation as well, evolving from a territorial defense mission to an expeditionary alliance. As Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has detailed, this means investments in new capabilities, including strategic airlift, special operations forces, and intelligence.

Last week, not for the first time since he left office, Spain's former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar had lunch with President George W. Bush at the White House. He's doing a lot better than his socialist successor Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero at staying in touch with the Bush administration.

Behind the positive talk, deep tensions still threaten trans-Atlantic relations.

Lo peor de la actual crisis de la OTAN no reside en su disparidad de capacidades militares. Lo que pone en peligro hoy la cohesión de la Alianza y está determinando si tiene o no un futuro es la pérdida de una razón de ser compartida igualmente por todos sus miembros.

We wanted to make an initial contribution to the emerging debate. So this report touches upon the true nature, the strategic vision, the missions, the structures, and the membership of NATO. We are no longer living under benign conditions. On the contrary we must accept that.

The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was established in 1995 with the aim of reducing transatlantic tensions. Ten years later, the number of US-European disputes has multiplied and transatlantic relations are at their worst since 1945.

America's "Europe problem" and Europe's "America problem" have been debated for years. The debate is usually framed in terms of policy differences: over prosecuting the war on terrorism; over the United Nations' role in world affairs; over the Kyoto Protocol on the global environment; over Iraq. The differences are real.

Earlier this year, Gerhard Schröder caused a stir with a speech to the Munich Security Conference. When he said that NATO was no longer the forum for top level strategic discussions between Europeans and Americans he was stating the obvious. But he missed a bigger opportunity when he suggested convening a panel of the "Great and Good" to fix NATO.

The heightened tensions between the United States and Europe since 2000 have been widely discussed in terms of competing foreign policy visions. The Bush administration’s insistence on a robust and independent response to terrorism contrasted with the frequently more cautious European policies.

Reflecting on the impact of the visit by US President Bush to Europe, EPC Founding Chairman Stanley Crossick argues that no fundamental change in US foreign policy can be expected. While Europe and the United States share a number of key political objectives, it remains unclear whether the President seeks a true, and equal, partnership with Europe.

If Europe helps China to operate faster, farther and with more firepower, Japan and Taiwan will seek to meet the threat.

...We are determined to fight terrorism, strengthen security, and build peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond...