The joint CSIS/IFRI project "Europe, Russia, and the United States: Finding a New Balance seeks to reframe this trilateral relationships for the relevant policymaking communities. We are motivated by the possibility that new opportunities may be emerging with leaderships changes in Moscow and Washington. In particular, we hope that our analyses and recommendations will be useful as France takes over the chair of the European Union on July 1, 2008.

In contemporary international relations, sanctions are a means of settling disputes and attaining specific policy objectives, often employed to reflect the dissatisfaction of certain members of the international community over another member’s domestic or international behavior. Some argue that sanctions never work, whereas others think that they serve to moderate undesirable behavior, although often not entirely effectively. In recent years, sanctions have been imposed against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran to compel these regimes to give up their nuclear weapons or suspected nuclear programs. How effective have these sanctions been, and what do these cases say about China’s evolving attitudes toward sanctions as a nonproliferation tool?

On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced he would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and would “also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies,” in the context of a broader, global partnership with India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace. India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities, exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India’s test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998.

Should the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons serve as a serious guide for U.S. policy? This goal has been the declared purpose of several U.S. administrations. It has been included in treaties to which the United States is party and in official U.S. documents. In truth, however, with the possible exception of a brief period shortly following World War II after the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was adopted by the Truman administration, the goal of a nuclear weapons–free world has not provided a compass for policy, nor has it had any real operational impact on U.S. government policies.

Japan, traditionally one of the most prominent advocates of the international non-proliferation regime, has consistently pledged to forswear nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, evolving circumstances in Northeast Asia, particularly North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 and China’s ongoing military modernization drive, have raised new questions about Japan’s vulnerability to potential adversaries and, therefore, the appeal of developing an independent nuclear deterrent. The previous taboo within the Japanese political community of discussing a nuclear weapons capability appears to have been broken, as several officials and opinion leaders have urged an open debate on the topic. Despite these factors, a strong consensus — both in Japan and among Japan watchers — remains that Japan will not pursue the nuclear option in the short-to-medium term.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. As of February 2008, 178 nations had signed it and 144 had ratified. To enter into force, 44 specified nations must ratify it; 35 have done so. The Senate rejected the treaty in 1999; the Bush Administration opposes it. The United States has observed a nuclear test moratorium since 1992. There have been many calls worldwide for the United States and others to ratify the treaty. Many claim that it would promote nuclear nonproliferation; some see it as a step toward nuclear disarmament. Several measures have been introduced in Congress regarding the treaty; it might become an issue in the presidential election.

The United States has long recognized the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and missiles. This report, which analyzes NBC weapons programs potential threat patterns around the globe, is updated as needed. The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the world is shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. There are five established nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). India and Pakistan declared their nuclear weapons capability with nuclear tests in 1998, as did North Korea in 2006. Israel is also widely believed to have a nuclear weapon arsenal.

Policy makers of both major parties recognize that the U.S. nuclear posture must change to reflect today’s world and future challenges to national security. Congress has passed legislation calling for a reexamination of U.S. nuclear policy by 2009. Four of the most seasoned architects of U.S. national security policy—George Shultz, secretary of state under President Reagan; William Perry, secretary of defense under President Clinton; Henry Kissinger, secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford; and Sam Nunn, former senator from Georgia—have forcefully articulated the need for a new policy. They argue that the United States should embrace the goal of a “world free of nuclear weapons” as a vital contribution to preventing more nations, and eventually terrorists, from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Alors que la question nucléaire en Europe était au centre des préoccupations de sécurité du continent – et même, à bien des égards, au coeur du conflit stratégique Est-Ouest – au temps de la Guerre froide, les quinze dernières années ont vu le dispositif allié s’étioler progressivement, à la fois en quantité, en importance politique, et en place dans le dispositif de défense occidental. Ni l’administration Bush ni les gouvernements européens actuels n’ont souhaité renverser cette tendance. Dans ces conditions, il est possible de dire que l’Alliance atlantique s’approche du seuil en deçà duquel les armements nucléaires non stratégiques déployés en Europe n’auront plus, bientôt, qu’une importance symbolique, et seront dénués de tout intérêt militaire – d’autant que se profilent à l’horizon des échéances qui pourraient mettre en cause l’existence même de cette présence.

The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands. The steps we are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger. With nuclear weapons more widely available, deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.

In mid-October, the U.S. Commerce Department began to implement a new program to reduce controls on the sale of militarily useful American products to China. For the first time, certain companies in China are being allowed to receive such products from the United States without obtaining an export license that would otherwise be required. The Commerce Department is selecting beneficiaries of this program in China on the ground that they are trustworthy–that is, that they are exclusively civilian and can be trusted to confine to peaceful use items that are also highly useful for military production or for making weapons of mass destruction. Freed from the requirement of an export license, the companies, known as “Validated End-Users,” will be able to import a range of controlled U.S. goods more quickly and easily, since U.S. officials will no longer review these shipments before they go out.

South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons program in 1991, chemical and biological warfare program in 1993, and missile program in 1994 and became a “disarmament trendsetter” in bringing to signature an “African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone” in 1995 and compromise in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences in 1995, 2000, and 2005. Despite the South African government’s continuing commitment to WMD nonproliferation and arms export controls, several issues related to WMD proliferation remain. This paper examines proliferation problems and transnational networks that are tied to South Africa’s history as a developer of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons during the apartheid era (1948-1994). The problem of nuclear proliferation is examined through the lens of the recent A.Q. Khan case and involvement by a South African network. The problem of biological weapons proliferation is illustrated through the recent case of Dr. Daan Goosen—a key scientist in the 1980s biological warfare program (Project Coast) and the former director of the Roodepoort Research Laboratories. The problem of terrorism and transnational networks is examined using evidence of al-Qaeda activities and those of related groups in South Africa. Links are drawn between WMD proliferation supply and terrorist networks and indications and warning of WMD terrorism emanating from South Africa are examined.

The risk of rogue states and terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is an imminent threat to international peace and security. To counter this threat it is important to maintain vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, material and related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering WMDs. As relevant technology becomes available commercially, efforts to control the sophistication of missiles and their spread are becoming increasingly more difficult. At the same time the development of ballistic missile defences and the fact that space programmes of some countries may inadvertently lead to proliferation of technologies, which can be used in missile programmes, spurs international concern.

ISIS recently obtained commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken on August 10, 2007 of a large portion of Eastern Syria along the Euphrates River. After an extensive search and analysis of the imagery, ISIS found a site that could be the target of the Israeli raid inside Syria on September 6, 2007.1 The tall building in the image may house a reactor under construction and the pump station along the river may have been intended to supply cooling water to the reactor.

If India’s policy toward Iran and its suspected nuclear ambitions continue to cause concern and anxiety in Washington, it was largely New Delhi’s own making. From the very beginning, India was unable to understand the American preoccupation with the ayatollahs. Indeed, Washington’s concerns vis-à-vis Iran and its nuclear program did not figure prominently in Indian calculations when it started negotiating the civilian nuclear deal with the Bush administration.

For some time Mohamed ElBaradei, the Egyptian diplomat who heads the International Atomic Energy Agency, has made it clear he considers himself above his position as a U.N. civil servant. Rather than carry out the policy of the Security Council or the IAEA board, for which he nominally works, Mr. ElBaradei behaves as if he were independent of them, free to ignore their decisions and to use his agency to thwart their leading members -- above all the United States.

I expect that many – perhaps all – of you here today read an article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal at the start of this year. The writers would be as familiar to an audience in this country as they are respected across the globe: George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn. The article made the case for, and I quote, “a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage”. That initiative was to re-ignite the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and to redouble effort on the practical measures towards it.

A decade ago, many scholars and policy analysts who followed China dismissed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as an antiquated force that was essentially infantry, fighting with decades-old weapons, poor communications, and World War II era doctrine. China’s nuclear forces were also technologically outmoded and fixed to silo or tunnel launch sites. Very little information was available about China’s “Second Artillery Corps,” as China calls its strategic rocket forces. The United States knew that the PLA maintained a separate corps of rocket troops, but its doctrine and command and control structures remained shrouded in secrecy. Chinese diplomats, political leaders, and security thinkers regularly announced that China would adhere to a “no first use” policy, but very little published military information was available about how China intended to use its missile forces in crisis or war.

In developing Universal Compliance the authors started from the premise that the United States cannot solve the nuclear proliferation challenge alone. The strategy that will stand the greatest chance of success is one that enjoys the greatest possible degree of international support. And the way to get that support, we believed, was not to tell others what we think are the best policies and urge them to support them, but rather to ask how they would define the challenges, what policies they think would be most effective, and how they would improve upon suggestions we were making. In the end, we, as authors of this document, would have to weigh these inputs and decide what we think are most effective policies, but we wanted to see the problems and solutions from as many angles as possible before we did.

The Annual Report for 2006 serves as the Board´s report to the General Conference, and as the Agency´s report to the United Nations General Assembly and the general public. The draft Annual Report before you describes the results of Agency activities throughout the year. Many of our Member States are facing important development and security challenges, including the need to improve health care, to increase agricultural production, and to secure water and energy supplies. Vulnerabilities remain in nuclear and radiological safety and security. And the nuclear arms control regime needs to be reinforced. In all these areas, as the report illustrates, the Agency´s activities can and do make a difference.

This volume consists of research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) commissioned and vetted throughout 2006. For at least half of the chapters, authors presented versions of their work as testimony before Congressional oversight committees. No matter what one’s point of view, these chapters deserve close attention since all are focused on what is needed to assure U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation succeeds. The volume offers U.S. and Indian policy and law makers a detailed checklist of things to watch, avoid, and try to achieve.

The greater the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the risk that one day, by design or accident, they will be used by a state or a non-state actor with catastrophic consequences. The international community must therefore reject the recent tendency to accept the idea that, sooner or later, more countries will possess nuclear weapons, and that we can do nothing to stop it. There are more steps that can be taken to “dissuade” and “deter” non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) from acquiring such weapons, if the international community— particularly the nuclear weapons states—make this a higher priority other than in words.

The Agency has completed its evaluation of the physical inventory verification (PIV) of nuclear material at PFEP carried out between 16 and 18 September 2006 (GOV/2006/64, para. 3), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material, as declared by Iran, was consistent with the results of the PIV.

Yesterday’s White House signing ceremony of the “Henry Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act,” which permits U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with India, is the culmination of a year and a half of work, and more than its share of dramatic near-disasters, in India and in the United States. It makes possible a new era in U.S. relations with India.

No matter how one spins it, North Korea’s nuclear test of October 9, 2006 represents a major defeat for U.S. foreign policy.[1] Pyongyang torpedoed the stalemated six-party talks on its nuclear proliferation and also called what it sees as Washington’s bluff, i.e. that America can put enough pressure on North Korea—by imposing sanctions on the DPRK’s foreign banking after the six parties’ preliminary agreement in September, 2005 and by placing human rights on the negotiating agenda—that it will collapse, circumventing the need for detailed engagement with Pyongyang over proliferation. Indeed, if anything, the test shows Pyongyang’s continuing self-confidence about the future.

One of the stark delineations of power in the international community is between the official nuclear powers and the rest of the world. Although it is officially denied, many believe there is a link between nuclear status and international influence. All five states that have permanent nuclear status under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are also permanent members of the United Nations’ Security Council, charged with preserving the international peace. While several smaller states have given up their nuclear weapons, the world has yet to see a permanent nuclear state renounce its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, Britain’s forthcoming debate over the future of its nuclear arsenal is of great interest, not only because the United Kingdom is America’s closest ally, but because such a decision could have important international ramifications.

Des humains, des prisonniers pour la plupart, sont utilisés comme cobayes. Elles s’appelaient gerboise bleue, gerboise verte, gerboise rouge et gerboise blanche; ce ne sont là que quelques noms de code d’essais nucléaires français perpétrés dans le sud algérien. D’El Hammoudia à Reggane, à In Ekker à Tamanrasset, en passant par le massif de Tan Afella dans le Hoggar, l’horreur est la même.

L’Algérie et les Etats-Unis sont sur le point de signer un accord de coopération dans le domaine du nucléaire civil, a annoncé l’ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Alger, Robert S. Ford, dans un entretien au confrère La Tribune. «Nous avons discuté avec les Algériens de recherche et de collaboration dans ce domaine. Nous sommes sur le point de signer un accord de coopération entre nos deux pays dans le domaine de la collaboration dans l’énergie atomique», a déclaré l’ambassadeur américain.

This article argues that the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation has significant merit, promising tangible energy, economic, and security benefits to India, the United States and the wider international community. India’s acute energy needs and the upsides of the deal are greater than is generally appreciated. And while possible proliferation downsides exist, they have been exaggerated. The article lays out the argument in four parts. First, it examines India’s energy situation and its relationship to the Indian economy. Second, it looks at India’s options for improving its energy outlook and the role of nuclear energy among those options. Next, it addresses proliferation concerns; and, finally, it ends with a discussion of regional security considerations, especially with respect to a possible arms race with China.

On 6 June 2006, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of a taskforce to undertake an objective, scientific and comprehensive review into uranium mining, value-added processing and the contribution of nuclear energy in Australia in the longer term. This is known as the Review of Uranium Mining Processing and Nuclear Energy in Australia, referred to in this report as the Review.

In early September, as Kofi Annan passed through the Middle East on a farewell journey as United Nations secretary general, he made a stop in Tehran. There, in a meeting with Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, Iran’s president, he heard something startling.

President Jacques Chirac said this week that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a big danger, and that if Iran were to launch a nuclear weapon against a country like Israel, it would lead to the immediate destruction of Tehran.

Ouvrant, hier à l’hôtel El-Aurassi, les travaux de la Conférence régionale africaine sur la contribution de l’énergie nucléaire à la paix et au développement durable, le président de la République, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, s’est fait l’apôtre du droit légitime de l’Afrique à l’utilisation «juste et démocratique » à des fins exclusivement pacifiques de cette énergie.

Le Conseil de sécurité dispose-t-il de toutes les prérogatives et de tous les moyens juridiques pour empêcher la prolifération d’armes nucléaires. En théorie, oui, mais dans la pratique, le Conseil de sécurité est sélectif dans la mise en œuvre du TNP. Ainsi, seuls l’Iran et la Corée du Nord sont dans le collimateur de l’instance onusienne et des puissances nucléaires occidentales. Israël, qui s’est toujours fait passer pour la victime de l’histoire, a développé, avec le soutien de l’Occident, l’arme nucléaire et menace toute une région sans être inquiété. Pis, Israël refuse catégoriquement que l’AIE inspecte ses installations nucléaires. Mais Israël est le protégé de Washington, le gendarme du monde qui fait la loi du monde en fonction de ses intérêts géopolitiques.

Une conférence régionale africaine sur la contribution de l’énergie nucléaire à la paix et au développement durable. Pourquoi faire ? L’opportunité de sa tenue dans la capitale algérienne. Nucléaire, paix. Deux notions antinomiques?

At a time when most world powers have forged a united front against Iran because of its nuclear program, President Jacques Chirac arranged to send his foreign minister to Tehran to talk about a side issue, then abruptly canceled the visit earlier this month in embarrassing failure.

Une conférence africaine sur le nucléaire se tient, depuis hier à Alger, avec pour objectif de rationaliser l’utilisation du nucléaire et le mettre au service du développement de la communauté africaine. L’intitulé même de la conférence axée sur l’apport de l’énergie nucléaire «à la paix et au développement durable» en Afrique est tout un programme.

Le président de la République a souligné hier, l’urgence d’accélérer le processus de ratification devant hâter l’entrée en vigueur du Traité d’interdiction des essais nucléaires. Dans un discours, prononcé à l’occasion de l’ouverture de la conférence régionale africaine sur l’énergie nucléaire qui se tient à l’hôtel El Aurassi, et dont les travaux se poursuivent jusqu’à aujourd’hui, Abdelaziz Bouteflika a alerté l’opinion internationale quant «au risque que des armes nucléaires ou des sources radioactives tombent entre les mains de groupes terroristes ou autres acteurs non-étatiques».

U.S. official statements leave little doubt that cooperation occurred, but there are significant details missing on the scope of cooperation and the role of Pakistan’s government. North Korea and Pakistan both initially denied that nuclear technology was provided to North Korea; President Musharraf admitted, however, in 2006 that such technology had been transferred. This report describes the nature and evidence of the cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan in missiles and nuclear weapons, the impact of cooperation on their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and on the international nonproliferation regime. It will be updated as events warrant.

Le premier réacteur nucléaire de recherche marocain est fin prêt. De type Triga Mark II, il subit actuellement des essais à froid. La partie nucléaire sera déclenchée courant décembre. Tous les préalables techniques et réglementaires ont été remplis. L’annonce officielle de son lancement est attendue dans les jours qui viennent. Celle-ci est tributaire d’une décision politique, ce qui explique également le retard pris dans la mise en place de ce réacteur.

In the late 1990s, U.S. intelligence indicated that North Korea was trying to procure materials for the construction of a uranium enrichment facility that could produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In October 2002, James A. Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, traveled to Pyongyang and confronted North Korean officials on their suspected uranium enrichment program. The Agreed Framework subsequently unraveled and North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. The Bush administration ultimately decided that bilateral talks with Pyongyang were not the answer and chose to pursue a multilateral forum to address the DPRK nuclear problem. That policy has been carried out under the prevue of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, Japan, North and South Korea, Russia and the United States.

As the United States and some of its allies prepare to send warships to help enforce UNSC Resolution 1718 against North Korea, it would do well to take a hard look at the politics of the situation, particularly regarding at (or over) sea interdictions. Frankly China, Japan, South Korea and Russia are unlikely to be directly involved in such interdictions, albeit for different reasons. And all but Japan would not welcome such interdictions by outsiders especially in waters under their jurisdiction. Indeed it is not clear who can or will do what to enforce the Resolution at or over the sea.

North Korea’s nuclear program got off to an early start with Soviet assistance in the 1960s. By the mid-1980s, the Kim regime was embarking on a nuclear weapons program with the construction of a large reprocessing plant to make weapons-grade plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. Meanwhile, Kim Il Sung assured the international community that his country had no intention of building a nuclear weapon, which he said would be useless in the face of a massive American nuclear arsenal. In the early 1990s, fearing that North Korea might already have reprocessed sufficient plutonium for two small nuclear devices, the United States began negotiating what was called the “Agreed Framework,” which would give.

Notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, the Iranian regime has a clear and intense interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers are located to its North, East, and West, and the U.S. military is positioned on all its land and sea borders. The lesson of the Iraqi and North Korean experience is that countries that pursue antagonistic policies toward the U.S. are much less likely to face military intervention if they possess nuclear weapons.

As the impasse over Iran’s nuclear-weapons program grows inexorably into a crisis, a kind of consensus has taken root in the minds of America’s foreign-policy elite. This is that military action against Iran is a sure formula for disaster. The essence of the position was expressed in a cover story in Time magazine this past September.

On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it conducted a nuclear test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. As the United Nations Security Council met and approved a resolution condemning the tests and calling for punitive sanctions, North Korea remained defiant, insisting that any increased pressure on the regime would be regarded as an act of war.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency, makes it very plain why the U.N. has become the Trojan horse of nuclear proliferation. In an interview with Newsweek magazine on Oct. 20, Mr. ElBaradei laid bare his plan -- guaranteed to lead the international community into nuclear war.

For nearly 50 years, worries about a nuclear Middle East centered on Israel. Arab leaders resented the fact that Israel was the only atomic power in the region, a resentment heightened by America’s tacit approval of the situation. But they were also pretty certain that Israel (which has never explicitly acknowledged having nuclear weapons) would not drop the bomb except as a very last resort. That is why Egypt and Syria were unafraid to attack Israel during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. “Israel will not be the first country in the region to use nuclear weapons,” went the Israelis’ coy formula. “Nor will it be the second.”

Now that North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, perhaps the time has come to openly accept the demise of the global nuclear arms control and non-proliferation regime. From Iran and North Korea to the nuclear black market of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, new challenges continue to emerge and threaten to undermine the global arms control architecture.

In a speech at the National Democratic Party's conference on September 19, 2006, General Secretary of the Policy Committee Gamal Mubarak said that Egypt is ready to continue its nuclear research program, which was ended (at least officially) after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. A few days later, his father, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, confirmed his son's statement. He said that Egypt must take advantage of new energy sources and that the development of a peaceful nuclear program is part of such an intention.

A comprehensive test ban treaty, or CTBT, is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties currently limit testing to underground only, with a maximum force equal to 150,000 tons of TNT. According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45. The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not conducted nuclear tests since 1990. North Korea announced in October 2006 that it will conduct a nuclear test in the future.

First, working closely with China obviously is a very important aspect of our strategy toward North Korea, but we need to be realistic about our differences. We all should appreciate the role that China has played as host of the Six-Party Talks. I have no doubt that Chi¬na’s leaders are sincerely interested in a diplomatic resolution of the core issues on the Korean peninsula. They have done a agnificent job bringing the differ¬ent parties together and facilitating dialogue on a critical issue. All of us involved should thank them.

Too often obscured by the smoke of transatlantic tensions over the best “means” to reach foreign policy goals is the fact that the United States and the states of Europe still tend to agree fundamentally on what are the desired “ends.” Shared transatlantic global interests today span questions such as countering international terrorism, promoting democratic government, economic development, and regional security and stability, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But disagreement between the United States and its European partners over exactly how to pursue such broad objectives can sometimes call into question each side’s perception of whether the other really is committed to achieving the same end result.

Le débat s’engage : nucléaire civil, militaire ? Réaménagements des équilibres de force ? Légalités des pressions des puissances mondiales ? L’après-pétrole suffit-il à justifier cette course ? La scène mondiale est en émoi suite au dossier iranien et aux menaces nord-coréennes de procéder à des essais.

Smugglers have been caught trying to traffick dangerous radioactive material more than 300 times since 2002, statistics from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) show. Most of the incidents are understood to have occurred in Europe. The disclosures come as al-Qaeda is known to be intensfiying its efforts to obtain a radoactive device. Last year, Western security services, including MI5 and MI6, thwarted 16 attempts to smuggle plutonium or uranium. On two occasions small quantities of highly enriched uranium were reported missing. All were feared to have been destined for terror groups.

The United States is confident that Russia and China will join it in pushing for U.N. sanctions against Iran if it does not agree to suspend enriching uranium this week, a senior U.S. official said yesterday.

The summer of diplomacy began with a dramatic announcement: on May 31, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that if the Ahmadinejad government agreed to halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, the United States would talk directly with Tehran. Secretary Rice crafted the statement working alone at home.

A forgotten letter in which the founder of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, cited a need for nuclear weapons has stoked a debate over whether to negotiate with the West and raised questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions today.

Beijing’s cautious approach to defusing recent international tension over North Korea’s ballistic missile launches underscores the dilemmas it addresses in its difficult relationship with Pyongyang on the one hand and its interests with respect to the United States on the other. The missile launches were conducted in the midst of China’s renewed diplomacy to revive the stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs. Beijing is now likely to redouble efforts to revive the talks as the most effective mechanism to resolve the issues of both Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.

There are no bells, no sirens, and no early-warning systems that signal Iran’s eastward shift. After struggling to develop political and commercial relations with the United States and Europe, Iran has forsaken this approach. Having survived 25 years of isolation, war, and sanctions, Iran’s leadership is no longer willing to bargain away its national security concerns, nuclear ambitions, human rights policy, or commercial creativity for unfavorable Western political and trade incentives. The Iranian regime is looking to the East, where human rights violations and proliferation proclivities are considered practical matters of regime survival.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a kind of security regime which was established at President Bush’s suggestion in May 2003. Its purpose is to intercept vehicles, ships, and airplanes in order to protect against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Seventeen countries including the United States have currently joined in the PSI, and over sixty countries in the world support this initiative. PSI activities have been mainly focused on the interception of ships, which has had a practical effect since 2003. The reason is that the proliferation of WMD is generally accomplished by transportation using ships.

If the United States fails to achieve a diplomatic outcome that provides the international community with sufficient confidence that Iran is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, the results are likely to be dire. In the already volatile Middle East, the logical consequences of diplomatic failure are either an extended military conflict or a nuclear arms race, or both.

The North Korea proliferation problem is one of the two most dangerous flashpoints in East Asia today. It involves many complex issues: the legacy of Cold War divisions; nationalism in Northeast Asia; Sino-American rivalry for leadership and allies; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (both within the region and beyond); and finally, humanitarian tragedy. This article will evaluate one important issue among these interrelated issues is the role of the Sino-American relationship to the North Korea issue. It will do so by carefully evaluating Chinese policy toward North Korea and then considering the implications for the United States. It will argue that Chinese policy toward the North Korea proliferation issue is best understood as one manifestation of its overall policy toward East Asia. Beyond that, from a U.S. perspective, this policy has been much more positive than is commonly assumed.

Iran has had a nuclear program for close to 50 years, beginning with a research reactor purchased from the United States in 1959. The Shah’s plan to build 23 nuclear power reactors by the 1990s was regarded as grandiose, but not necessarily viewed as a “back door” to a nuclear weapons program, possibly because Iran did not then seek the technologies to enrich or reprocess its own fuel.There were a few suspicions of a nuclear weapons program, but these abated in the decade between the Iranian 1979 revolution and the end of the Iran-Iraq war, both of which brought a halt to nuclear activities.

Long discounted by arms control critics, traditional nonproliferation efforts now are undergoing urgent review and reconsideration even by their supporters. Why? In large part, because the current crop of nonproliferation understandings are ill-suited to check the spread of emerging long-range missile, biological, and nuclear technologies.

During the Cold War, both sides possessed weapons of mass destruction, but neither side used them, deterred by what was known as MAD, mutual assured destruction. Similar constraints have no doubt prevented their use in the confrontation between India and Pakistan. In our own day a new such confrontation seems to be looming between a nuclear-armed Iran and its favorite enemies, named by the late Ayatollah Khomeini as the Great Satan and the Little Satan, i.e., the United States and Israel. Against the U.S. the bombs might be delivered by terrorists, a method having the advantage of bearing no return address. Against Israel, the target is small enough to attempt obliteration by direct bombardment.

You don't hear much any more about "road maps," the "peace process," or "land for peace." The struggle for the Middle East has apparently entered a new phase in which Iran hijacks the Palestinian cause in order to establish its own influence in the region.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to provide my assessment of the recent North Korean missile launches and their implications for US policy options with respect to North Korea. I would like to note for the record that I am appearing in a personal capacity, and that the views I am expressing are my own.

For the first time in over a decade, the Russian government has published a White Paper on Nonproliferation, which seeks to present a detailed overview of Russia's policy and initiatives in that area. The document was prepared under the auspices of the Military-Industrial Commission and unveiled by the Chairman of the MIC, Vice-Premier and Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov on June 30, 2006. The White Paper provides a more comprehensive analysis of nonproliferation challenges and policies than earlier Russian conceptual documents on security and defense policy, including the 2005 "Principles of the Policy of the Russian Federation State in the Sphere of the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Their Delivery."

Mr. Chairman, let me begin by thanking you, along with Ranking Member Delahunt and the other distinguished members of the subcommittee, for giving me the opportu-nity to appear before you on the topic of U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy: Policies and Technical Capabilities.

Washington -- Accuse the U.S. State Department's Nicholas Burns of a double standard in advancing the Bush administration's efforts to stop nuclear-weapons proliferation, and he will thank you for the compliment.

El 28 de abril del 2006, el Director General informó acerca de la implementación del Acuerdo de Salvaguardas NPT en la República Islámica de Irán (Irán) (GOV/2006/27). Este informe comprende los avances desde abril del 2006.

North Korean technicians are reportedly in the final stages of fueling a long-range ballistic missile that some experts estimate can deliver a deadly payload to the United States. The last time North Korea tested such a missile, in 1998, it sent a shock wave around the world, but especially to the United States and Japan, both of which North Korea regards as archenemies. They recognized immediately that a missile of this type makes no sense as a weapon unless it is intended for delivery of a nuclear warhead.

The argument for overcoming the nuclear impasse with India – for altering the nuclear status quo that cut India off from international civil nuclear cooperation for over 30 years – has become increasingly persuasive. It has been clear for many years that maintaining existing U.S. laws and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines prohibiting such cooperation would not succeed in inducing New Delhi to join the NPT or give up nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s decisions to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty create an acute foreign policy problem for the United States.

Nuclear weapons are unique in their terrifying destructive potential. Their energy release is a million times larger than that of previous explosives. Mass destruction is inevitable if they are used in conflicts. One primitive atomic bomb destroyed — literally wiped out — the Japanese city of Hiroshima at the end of World War ii, causing more than 200,000 casualties. That bomb was little more than a trigger of a modern thermonuclear — or so-called hydrogen — bomb that releases 100 times or more destructive energy. There are several tens of thousands of them in the world today.

El 4 de febrero del 2006, la Junta de Gobernadores aprobó una resolución (GOV/2006/14) en el párrafo 1 de la cual, inter alia, destacaba que las cuestiones pendientes referentes a la implementación del Acuerdo de Salvaguardas del Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear en la República Islámica de Irán1 (Irán) podrían ser resueltas y la confianza en la naturaleza exclusivamente pacífica del programa de Irán construida por Irán, respondiendo positivamente a las solicitudes de medidas de confianza que la Junta ha hecho a Irán.

The presence of this provision quite properly raises questions about whether the central purpose of the NPT, which is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five nuclear powers acknowledged by the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States), is undermined.

The key point I want to make today is that the Iranian government is wrong when it claims that the NPT guarantees it a right to make nuclear fuel. Just because a nuclear activity or material can be used for peaceful purposes does not mean that any member of the NPT has an unconditional right to pursue or acquire it especially when the activity or material in question might bring it within days of having a bomb.

On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the creation of a “global partnership,” which would include “full” civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. Such cooperation would reverse almost 30 years of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

The United States has been a leader of worldwide efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. To this end, the international community and many individual states have agreed to a range of treaties, laws, and agreements known collectively as the nuclear nonproliferation regime, aimed at keeping nations that do not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them.

El 16 de febrero del 2006, el diario reformista en Internet Rooz (www.roozonline.com) informó por primera vez que clérigos extremistas de Qom habían emitido lo que el diario llamó "un nuevo fatwa" el cual declara que "el shari'a no prohíbe el uso de armas nucleares".

"La ofensa al honor del Profeta del Islam es de hecho un insulto al culto de Dios, y a la búsqueda de la verdad y la justicia, y una ofensa a todos los profetas de Dios. Obviamente, todos aquéllos que perjudican el honor del profeta del Islam... "

Como parte de su evaluación de la veracidad y totalidad de las declaraciones de Irán concernientes a su programa de enriquecimiento, la Agencia continúa investigando la fuente(s) de las partículas de uranio de bajo enriquecimiento (LEU), y de algunas de uranio de alto enriquecimiento (HEU), que fueron descubiertas en localizaciones en donde Irán ha declarado que los componentes de centrifugadora habían sido fabricados, utilizados y / o almacenados.

The problem of Chinese nuclear proliferation persists. The focus of attention has shifted from transfers directed by officials as an instrument of government policy to sales by Chinese firms that occur because of gaps in the Chinese domestic enforcement network.

Nonproliferation advocates in Washington argue that recent U.S. efforts extending civilian nuclear cooperation with India would undercut global nonproliferation. One argument is that many states like Japan and Brazil either had nuclear bombs or the ability to make them but gave up that ability in return for the civilian nuclear cooperation guaranteed by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Iranian engineers have completed sophisticated drawings of a deep subterranean shaft, according to officials who have examined classified documents in the hands of U.S. intelligence for more than 20 months.

The report indicated that the Complex had redundant facilities, security concerns, high cost, excessive competition between the weapons labs, and inadequate equipment for the production plants. To redress these problems, the Task Force proposed restructuring the Complex.

It is important to reject the view that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is inevitable, that there’s nothing that can be done to stop it. If the U.S. and other key actors do not change some of their policies, Iran probably will proceed to acquire the bomb.

It deems necessary for Iran to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency; reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;

La idea no es transferir el caso al Consejo de Seguridad, sino de hacer un informe al Consejo de Seguridad para que, posteriormente, éste pueda reforzar la autoridad de la AIEA. El caso no dejará la AIEA para ir al Consejo de Seguridad. Es un proceso interactivo, progresivo y también reversible si Irán cumple con las acciones que se esperan de él.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has uncovered potential connections between Iran’s nuclear energy program and military efforts on missiles and explosives, the New York Times reported today.

The IAEA Secretariat received today a Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran in which Iran informed the Agency that it "has decided to resume from 9 January 2006 those R & D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension."

There are three main features to this changing scene: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear technology; the emergence of clandestine procurement networks in nuclear materials and equipment; and the sluggishness in nuclear disarmament. In response to this changing landscape, I would like to suggest a few practical steps that can help us address these emerging challenges.

La Agencia continúa analizando la fuente(s) de las partículas de uranio de baja riqueza (LEU), y algunas partículas de uranio altamente enriquecido (HEU), que fueron descubiertas en Irán con vistas a garantizar la veracidad y fidelidad de las declaraciones de Irán referentes a sus actividades de enriquecimiento.

IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards, including conducting more intrusive inspections, to seek assurances that countries are not developing clandestine weapons programs. IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country’s nuclear activities rather than only verifying the peaceful use of a country’s declared nuclear material.

The lead-up to the war in Iraq put the issue of the potential acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups at the top of the list of Western priorities.

The United States has had some success in helping bring noncompliant countries back into compliance with their agreements and commitments, and in demonstrating that their return to compliance leads to improved relations.

Nonproliferation is the pre-eminent national security issue of our time, and there is probably no more important U.S. foreign policy goal than keeping nuclear weapons and the ingredients and know-how to make them out of the hands of those who would do us harm.

Thirty-five years ago, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up.

As painful experience in Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Iran has shown, the rules that govern nuclear exports, safeguard nuclear materials, and control and eliminate nuclear weapons are not self-enforcing.