At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that they would jointly host NATO's 60th anniversary summit next year in Strasbourg and its German sister town of Kehl - shortly after Sarkozy plans to announce his decision on whether France will become a full NATO member. What better timing could there be to show a much needed political breakthrough for the alliance? Recent statements made by Merkel, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Sarkozy regarding the sorry state of European defense capabilities have spurred the debate over struggling armies on the continent and the need for enhanced military cooperation. But this debate predates even the European institutions without yielding much return, and one might be excused for asking what could give new impetus to an essentially old idea.

Bucharest was initially dubbed the “enlargement summit.” But this epithet was soon obsolete, despite the go-ahead for Albania and Croatia to join. Western European opposition to Ukrainian and Georgian membership plans was too strong. Would enlargement necessarily increase NATO’s capacity? NATO’s Global Aspirations The dispute over enlargement reflects uncertainties about NATO’s function The summit in Romania was designed to increase NATO’s capacity for international action through the addition of new members and partners. But the admission of new members—for years an important means of creating stability in Europe itself—is just one strategy toward this end. Another point of debate in the run-up to Bucharest was the US initiative to enhance the partner status of states taking part in NATO operations. A third approach is the partnership programs that support reforms and stability in regions in which NATO is active. Finally, NATO is expanding relations with both the United Nations and regional organizations.

Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations has been in a constant state of transition as various international stakeholders seek ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.N. system. Recent controversies, such as corruption of the Iraq Oil-For-Food Program, allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, and instances of waste, fraud and abuse by U.N. staff, have focused renewed attention on the need for change and improvement of the United Nations. Many in the international community, including the United States, have increased pressure on U.N. member states to implement substantive reforms. The 110th Congress will most likely continue to focus on U.N. reform as it considers appropriate levels of U.S. funding to the United Nations and monitors the progress and implementation of ongoing and previously-approved reform measures.

On the face of it, India and NATO are poles apart. NATO is a military alliance. India is a non-aligned country with an independent foreign policy. Any engagement between India and NATO is, therefore, problematic. However, whether India likes it or not, NATO is on its doorsteps. It is conducting a UN-mandated mission in Afghanistan as the leader of ISAF. No one has called for NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Russia, China, Iran and India may all be uncomfortable with NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, but they have no alternative strategy to stabilise Afghanistan. So, they have to tolerate NATO in Afghanistan for the moment at least.

For more than a decade, NATO has attempted-by means of practical cooperation and multifaceted contacts-to establish with Russia a "qualitatively new" relationship governed by mutual trust and understanding.

There are still times when Germans must be reminded of history's lessons. One of those came after the Sept. 11 attacks, when a courageous Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder risked a no-confidence vote to take German combat troops to Afghanistan. His argument: History's obligation wasn't pacifism, as many argued, but a willingness to shed blood against new despots and terror. Sadly, Germany may fail history's test this week at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, beginning tomorrow. Chancellor Angela Merkel has led opposition to an alliance membership path sought by Georgia and Ukraine, states that grew out of the former Soviet Union. Though France, Italy and Spain also oppose, U.S. officials see Germany as the chief impediment because the majority of alliance countries are in favor, including all former Soviet bloc members. Merkel's arguments seem sound at first blush, but they are misguided and dangerous.

The efficiency problem of Europe’s armed forces is well known: of an impressive overall number of over two million men and women in uniform in the EU-27, only a meagre 10 to 15% are estimated to be deployable. The causes are manifold: the low cost-effectiveness of a plethora of small-scale capabilities, unnecessary intra-EU duplications, the presence of large numbers of quasi nondeployable conscripts, capability gaps in terms of ‘enablers’ (strategic transport, command, control and communications), and, although all EU Member States are conscious of the challenge and are implementing measures, slow transformation nonetheless from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare. The question must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, in ESDP as well as NATO, are sufficient to achieve the required transformation within a reasonable timeframe.

Two of the most contested issues that NATO faces in the run-up to the Bucharest summit will be extending membership invitations to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, as well as offering a Membership Action Plan to Ukraine and Georgia. This Issue Brief lays out the case why the Adriatic Three candidates should be invited into the alliance, and why Ukraine and Georgia should be given the opportunity to work with NATO under the Membership Action Plan.

Reafirmando su decidido apoyo a los esfuerzos del Secretario General y de su Enviado Personal por aplicar las resoluciones 1754 (2007) y 1783 (2007), Reafirmando su compromiso de ayudar a las partes a alcanzar una solución política justa, duradera y mutuamente aceptable que prevea la libre determinación del pueblo del Sáhara Occidental en el marco de disposiciones conformes a los principios y propósitos de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, y poniendo de manifiesto la función y las obligaciones que incumben a las partes a este respecto.

The issue of France’s status in the Atlantic Alliance, a legacy of the decision made by General de Gaulle in 1966 to withdraw France from the integrated military structure of NATO, is being raised once again. In his very first major foreign policy speech, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, broaching a subject which in his view had “long been taboo,” called for “the renovation of NATO and of its relationship with France” and spoke of “an Atlantic organization in which we would play a full role.” A few weeks later, the President confirmed in Washington, speaking before the United States Congress, that he wanted France—a founding member of the Alliance—”to assume its full role in the effort to renew NATO’s instruments and means of action” and that it could, if need be, resume “its full role in NATO.”

The report investigates NATO’s relationship with non-NATO countries and NATO’s journey from being an alliance firmly located within a Euro-Atlantic geographical setting to an alliance that actively contemplates its global role. The report distinguishes between two very different interpretations of “global” – NATO being global or NATO acting globally – and links these two interpretations of “global” to NATO’s integrationalist and interventionist roles. Integration is seen as a strategy pursued actively by NATO especially since the end of the Cold War in its relations with non-NATO countries (partner, contact, dialogue and initiative countries). However, although the integrationalist strategy so far is judged to have been highly successful, the report nevertheless cautions against taking the strategy onto a global level. Doing so is likely to open up difficult issues of hierarchy and legitimacy, which will have an adverse effect on NATO. On the other hand the report argues in favour of a development of NATO as an alliance that is able to act globally. This, it is argued, implies further development of NATO’s interventionist strategy and further considerations about the legality of interventions and the obligation to intervene to protect. Neither option therefore offer any easy solution and clear cut answers to NATO’s role in a global security environment, although it does seem clear that going only – or too far – down the road towards a Global NATO consisting solely of democracies is likely to be self-defeating and to have an adverse effect on NATO’s legitimacy.

NATO and the EU’s post-Cold War accomplishments are legion, and have confounded those who in the early 1990s predicted NATO’s demise or saw the EU’s failure over the Balkans as sounding the deathknell of its foreign policy ambitions. Both have expanded to include formerly Communist countries, and almost all those not already in NATO and the EU have been offered membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) or are part of the EU’s pre-accession programme. This twin-track expansion has extended the Euro-Atlantic community’s reach, creating a ‘zone of peace’ so that for the first time in 500 years, the European continent is not at the centre of a conflict.

Soon after his election as French president, Nicolas Sarkozy signalled that he would like French officers to return to NATO’s military command. He also said that France should stop treating NATO as a ‘bogeyman’ and that it should ‘renovate’ its relationship with the alliance. In doing so, Sarkozy b roke a long-standing taboo in French foreign policy, and opened the possibility of a dramatic improvement in EU-NATO co-operation.

NATO will hold a summit in Bucharest on April 2-4, 2008, and a principal issue will be the consideration of the candidacies for membership of Albania, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, or the Republic of Macedonia). These candidate states are small, with correspondingly small militaries, and their inclusion in the alliance cannot be considered strategic in a military sense.

Este informe se presenta en cumplimiento de la resolución 1783 (2007) del Consejo de Seguridad, de 31 de octubre de 2007, en la que el Consejo prorrogó el mandato de la Misión de las Naciones Unidas para el Referéndum del Sáhara Occidental (MINURSO) hasta el 30 de abril de 2008. En esa resolución, el Consejo pidió al Secretario General que presentara un informe sobre la situación del Sáhara Occidental antes de que finalizara el período del mandato. En el presente informe se explica cómo ha evolucionado la situación desde que se publicó mi informe de fecha 19 de octubre de 2007 (S/227/619) sobre la situación relativa al Sáhara Occidental y mi informe de fecha 25 de enero de 2008 (S/2008/45) sobre el estado y la marcha de las negociaciones sobre el Sáhara Occidental.

The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission is approaching five years of operations in Afghanistan. This report is a snapshot - rather than an exhaustive list of efforts by all contributing nations - of where progress is being made, in the main areas in which the international community is providing support to the Afghan Government. It makes no claim to show all sides of every issue relating to Afghanistan’s development. NATO is not impartial in Afghanistan – we have chosen the side of the UN, the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. But it is accurate; the information herein is drawn from authoritative sources, including within NATO. Where possible, we have identified those sources, and given examples to substantiate our assertions.

As host of the 2008 NATO Summit, it is my great pleasure to welcome you to Bucharest. In many ways every NATO summit is a defining moment for the alliance. The Bucharest Summit is no exception. Along with what have become the familiar challenges for NATO when dealing with questions about enlargement and its evolving relationship with Russia, the alliance is now faced with the mounting challenge of ensuring that the mission in Afghanistan ultimately emerges as a success. NATO’s success in Afghanistan is key for the future of that country, for our fight against terrorism, and thus for our own defense. We must ensure that the progress is irreversible.

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, met today to enlarge our Alliance and further strengthen our ability to confront the existing and emerging 21st century security threats. We reviewed the significant progress we have made in recent years to transform NATO, agreeing that this is a process that must continue. Recognising the enduring value of the transatlantic link and of NATO as the essential forum for security consultations between Europe and North America, we reaffirmed our solidarity and cohesion and our commitment to the common vision and shared democratic values embodied in the Washington Treaty. The principle of the indivisibility of Allied security is fundamental. A strong collective defence of our populations, territory and forces is the core purpose of our Alliance and remains our most important security task. We reiterate our faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is beginning to fracture. Its members, sharing the triumphalism that underpinned U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War, took on burdens that have proved more difficult than expected. Increasingly, they are failing to meet the challenges confronting them. The principal problem is Afghanistan. After the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, NATO for the first time invoked Article V, its pledge that an attack against one member country would be considered an attack against all. But NATO’s forces are being relentlessly attacked by the Taliban, and among NATO countries popular support for maintaining troops there is fading. If NATO fails in Afghanistan, the consequences could be as damaging for its survival as the Vietnam War was for the now defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

The report in your hands is the communal response of researchers at The Finnish Institute of International Affairs to a question I posed in the spring of this year: What is NATO? The question arose out of observations that although NATO is the subject of frequent debate in Finland, the topic – NATO – is frequently not understood. The discussion in Finland has simply not kept up with the metamorphosis the Alliance has undergone during the past decade.

This report explores the complexity of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The actual conduct of operations in Afghanistan is measured against the principles of NATO Peace Support Operations. The report analyses the different aspects of operations and finally lists important recommendations that should be considered if more effective operations are to be conducted, and if success it to be achieved. The study examines the important lessons that can be derived from the current ISAF mission on the basis of field studies focusing on all levels of command. Overall, the findings suggest that the ISAF mission suffers from a lack of coherent political strategic understanding of the mission, the tasks and strategy. The impression is very much one of a mission being implemented with a lack of civilian resources, holistic strategy, interagency coordination and lacking an appreciation of the context and importance of mission success – there is a need for an overall political military strategic campaign plan. This being said, success is still within reach, but a serious discussion on the international commitment, the desired end state and the way ahead is both urgent and important.

The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, recently signalled that he would like French officers to return to NATO’s military command. He also said that France should stop treating NATO as a ‘bogeyman’ and that it should ‘renovate’ its relationship with the alliance. In doing so, Sarkozy has broken a long-standing taboo in French foreign policy, and opened the possibility of a dramatic improvement in EUNATO co-operation.

At its summit in Bucharest at the end of April 2008, among other things NATO will deal with the question of missile defence for Europe. A decision on the way ahead would be of fundamental importance for the general strategic direction taken by the alliance.

This is a commentary on the challenges being faced by NATO as it strives to evolve a new strategic concept, prevail in Afghanistan, address competing resource demands from the European Union, replace its unfair policy of 'costs fall where they lie' with a more equitable financing instrument, and transforms itself to fight on in the interests of freedom loving peoples around the globe.

The return of both China and Islam in world history after a three-century-long eclipse has been the defining feature of the international stage since 1979. In the first decade afterwards, the West was simply too focused on the “second Cold War” against the Soviet Bloc to ponder the meaning of the revolutions engineered by Den Xiao Ping in China and Khomenei in Iran. In the second decade, a victorious West, indulging in rhetorical self-intoxication, mistook the most recent stage of a century-old globalization process for the end of history and even geography.

The SDA is proud to present this report of the June 8 high-level international conference ‘NATO & ESDP: Forging New Links’ organised by the SDA and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) with Hewlett-Packard and with the support of NATO, Lockheed Martin and the Atlantic Council of the United States. The conference addressed the links between NATO and ESDP in terms of how complementary they are, and also featured case studies in co-operation between NATO and the EU as well as looking at interoperability and armaments co-operation.

With the establishment of rapid response forces, the EU as well as NATO aim to address future security challenges and to support their internal force transformation. Given the ongoing rivalries between NATO and the EU and the shortage of deployable forces, the added value of such standby forces and their apparent duplication is increasingly questioned. Recent cutbacks in the force size underline this trend. While they share similar origins and purposes, the NATO Response Force and EU Battlegroups not only display different characteristics, but also have different effects.

La présente note expose les grandes lignes d’une méthode de planification de niveau politique stratégique pour la résolution des conflits. Cette méthode se prête particulièrement à des engagements lourds et de longue durée, tels que ceux actuellement menés en RCI, en Afghanistan, en RDC et dans les Balkans. Cette méthode a été développée par le biais d’un guide de planification, rédigé par la FRS, avec la contribution des sociétés US-CREST et DCI/STRATCO, dans le cadre d’une étude financée et dirigée par le Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentation (CICDE). Cette étude s’inscrivait en complémentarité des travaux exploratoires sur la planification stratégique en coalition menés par la France dans le cadre des expérimentations multinationales (Multinational Experiment) 4 & 5. Ce guide a bénéficié de l’apport d’experts, s’exprimant à titre personnel, provenant de différentes administrations directement concernées (ministère de la Défense, ministère des Affaires étrangères, Secrétariat général de la défense nationale).

The defense of this continent has been a consuming goal for me for most of my professional life – more than four decades, under multiple administrations of both American political parties. I’ve seen firsthand the powerful synergy that comes from free nations pulling together to defend our shared values and interests. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and since becoming Secretary of Defense, I have spent a good deal of time considering how the alliance must evolve in order to remain vital and relevant in a new era.

During his time at the U.N., Ambassador Bolton was a forceful advocate of American interests, a powerful voice for U.N. reform, and a staunch defender of the cause of liberty on the world stage. He was an outspoken critic of corruption, mismanagement, waste, and inefficiency. He shook up an institution that has for decades been resistant to change and cast a revealing light on an elite U.N. establishment that has long thrived in a culture of complacency and secrecy. His commitment to both the advancement of U.S. interests and the cause of international freedom and security was unwavering, and he dramatically raised the profile of issues ranging from peacekeeping abuses to the need for increased transparency, accountability, and effectiveness at the United Nations.

NATO Allies place the highest value on the CFE regime. They participated actively in the CFE Extraordinary Conference called by the Russian Federation and held in Vienna from 12-15 June 2007. They listened carefully to the Russian Federation’s concerns and responded by submitting elements for a final document that suggested a positive way forward. The announcement by the Russian Federation issued on the 14th of July 2007 to suspend as of the 12th of December 2007 its participation in the work of this landmark Treaty, including its flank regime and associated documents is deeply disappointing. The Allies are very concerned by this unilateral decision.

Something new and significant is going on in the world drugs market. In last year's World Drug Report we made the argument that drug control is working and the world drug problem is being contained. This 2007 Report provides further robust evidence of this trend. For almost every kind of illicit drug - cocaine, heroin, cannabis and amphetamine- type stimulants (ATS) - there are signs of overall stability, whether we speak of cultivation, production or consumption. Hopefully, within the next few years evidence to support this claim will become statistically and logically incontrovertible.

NATO Allies agreed today to set up a new NATO agency to acquire and manage C-17 strategic transport aircraft on behalf of a group of 15 NATO nations and two Partnership for Peace countries. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer welcomed the decision. “The Strategic Airlift Capability initiative will help address NATO’s -- and Europe’s -- critical shortfall in strategic airlift. This capability will support our current operations, including in Afghanistan, and will be a pillar of the Alliance’s long-term transformation.”

Today the Extraordinary Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) requested by the Russian Federation concluded. This conference took place in Vienna from 11 - 15 June 2007.

Israel is abuzz with the talk of incompetence and failure. The interim report of the Winograd Commission was released last week, and it lays out, in excruciating detail, the multifaceted catastrophe that was last summer’s war against Hezbollah: the ignorance of the prime minister and defense minister concerning military matters; the appalling ineptitude of Dan Halutz, the chief of staff of the IDF, in commanding the military and advising the country’s political leadership; the absence of a preexisting plan to deal with an entirely predictable crisis; the declaration of strategic goals that were entirely divorced from the means required to achieve them; the ill-conceived, ineffective air war and the last-second, impulsive ground campaign; and the six-year history of passivity and retreat on the northern border that emboldened Hezbollah and telegraphed Israel’s lack of military readiness.

Who is responsible for solving the world’s problems? It’s a more serious question than it seems. In the end, all discussion about the United Nations is really about assessing liability for one state of affairs or another — wars, repression, destitution. If you culled through the story lines about the UN as if you were diagramming sentences, you’d find the subject “United Nations” is usually followed by the verb “failed.” But what is the proper expectation of the world body? If this entity is held answerable for so many of the world’s miseries and injustices, then surely we must know at whose feet we are laying all this blame.

European countries are divided over a recent U.S. offer to begin negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic on basing components of a U.S. anti-missile system on their territories. Washington has proposed building a radar for the system in the Brdy district in the Czech Republic and a site for 10 missile interceptors near Koszalin , Poland , to counter a potential threat from longer-range Iranian missiles aimed at the U.S. East Coast and parts of Europe . The proposal has stirred strong opposition from Russia . (See ACT, March 2007.)

NATO, of course, is one of history’s great survivors. From Suez in 1956 to the Euromissile crisis 25 years later, and through the Vietnam and (so far) Iraq debacles, the alliance has persevered and often thrived. Following the September 11 attacks, nato invoked—for the first time—Article V, considering an attack on one an attack on all. nato went to war against global terror, and in 2006 it assumed full responsibility for the un International Security and Assistance Force(ISAF)in Afghanistan.

The Security Council, Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions, Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

El Consejo de Seguridad, Recordando la declaración de su Presidencia, de 29 de marzo de 2006,(S/PRST/2006/15) y sus resoluciones 1696 (2006), de 31 de julio de 2006, y 1737 (2006), de 23 de diciembre de 2006, y reafirmando lo que allí se dispone, Reafirmando su adhesión al Tratado sobre la no proliferación de las armas nucleares, la necesidad de que todos los Estados Partes en ese Tratado cumplan plenamente todas sus obligaciones, y recordando el derecho de los Estados Partes, de conformidad con los artículos I y II de ese Tratado, de desarrollar la investigación, la producción y la utilización de la energía nuclear con fines pacíficos sin discriminación.

Belgium's 2006 OSCE Chairmanship ends with the Ministerial Council on December 4 and 5 Brussels and is theresfore a good opportunity to take stock of the OSCE's activities over the past year- even if the picture is rather grim.

NATO is in the middle of a fundamental reorganisation of its own role and the way it works. New military capabilities as well as new political structures are argued as essential in order for the organisation to manage the risks and threats of a new security environment. What are the major elements in this transformation? What challenges or disagreements are associated with this transformation idea? And how can NATO’s future transformation be conceived?

When NATO leaders meet at the Riga summit in late November 2006, they will confront a far different security landscape than the one faced by the founding fathers of the alliance. Those leaders established NATO in 1949 to defend Western Europe against the clear and present danger posed by Soviet military power. The United States, as the most powerful member of the alliance by far, came to dominate the transatlantic relationship, both politically and militarily. Despite some bumps along the road, notable among them French withdrawal from the integrated military structure and the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty controversy, NATO managed to maintain its cohesion and solidarity through the darkest days of the Cold War. Yet, when the Soviet Union unexpectedly collapsed, NATO did not follow its old nemesis into the ash heap of history. The instability generated in central and eastern Europe by the Soviet collapse reminded European allies of the importance of maintaining the transatlantic alliance as a hedge against an uncertain future. The United States, for its part, had no desire to abandon the primary instrument through which it exercised influence in Europe, which remained vital to its long-term security interests.

In a wide-ranging speech, de Hoop Scheffer insisted that NATO’s capabilities had to be improved, burdens shared more equitably and the focus placed on identifying NATO’s added-value. Highlighting problems, the Secretary General described current funding of the NATO Response Force (NRF) as “almost a lottery” and some Member States’ conditions as “putting caveats on NATO’s future”. He also wanted an end to the “beauty contest” between the Alliance and the EU. There had to be no duplication of efforts.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan delivered his swan song today at the Truman Presidential Library in Missouri.It was a thinly veiled parting shot at U.S. foreign policy delivered by an embittered U.N. leader seething with self-righteous indignation and resentment. Annan's Missouri speech will go down in history as one of the most blatant assaults on a U.S. administration by a serving U.N. official.

It is reasonable that honest, compassionate people seek a means for governments to air their differences. It is also reasonable that honest, compassionate people should desire some way to voluntarily pool resources to provide charitable aid to those who are starving or are victims of natural disaster. Indeed, this is the image of the United Nations that has been sold to the world since its inception. It is not, however, the reality.

In recent years, the United Nations has often gone out of its way to avoid getting involved in the world's trouble spots. It ignored genocide in Darfur. Pulled out of Iraq in 2003. Done nothing to stem Iran's nuclear ambitions. Can an organization this compromised do much to improve things?

“Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, “Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm today in Riga our resolve to meet the security challenges of the 21st century and defend our populations and common values, while maintaining a strong collective defence as the core purpose of our Alliance. Our 26 nations are united in democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and faithful to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

I have said it on many ocasions, and will say it again here today: we don't need a global NATO. That is not what our transformation is all about. The kind of NATO that we need - and that we are successfully creating- is an Alliance that defends its members against global threats: terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and failed states.

But in the months leading up to the Summit, a number of factors have intervened to lower expectations for and shift the focus of the Summit. Internally, some member states remain deeply divided over NATO’s post-Cold War purpose and the extent and nature of the Alliance’s roles and missions beyond Europe. In addition, a degree of enlargement fatigue has set in, slowing the pace at which the Alliance will absorb additional members. Externally, NATO now finds itself engaged in the most substantial and consequential military operations it has ever conducted. Current operations in Afghanistan have rightly consumed an enormous amount of the Alliance’s energy and will likely dominate much of the discussion in Riga, though improving the situation there will require more than military solutions. Indeed, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is becoming the primary indicator of the Alliance’s ability to tackle the kind of challenges that will likely define the 21st century.

Unfortunately, Canada has failed to maintain its contributions to world peace and security at a high enough level to guarantee the nation a seat at the world table, or even at a level that permits it to wield even moderate amounts of influence on events and decisions made by other nations. The current state of decline is a direct result of the failure of Canada to invest in peace building activities, and the neglect of the prior role played by the nation in fostering world peace and security.

During my tenure as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – a body independent from the Alliance itself as legislative and executive bodies should be – I have worked hard in improving the Assembly’s work and in developing its reach so as to gradually transform an originally limited role as a consultative forum for national parliamentarians into a tool for “democratic control” within NATO. I believe the parliamentarians in the Assembly have a crucial role to play, as they do in the Council of Europe or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Fifteen years ago at the 1991 Rome Summit, NATO started in earnest its post-Cold War transformation with the adoption of a new Strategic Concept. Although at that time the Alliance had not yet initiated any operation, within less than a year its airborne early warning aircraft (AWACS) were patrolling the sky above Bosnia and Herzegovina and the mobile headquarters of its now defunct Northern Army Group command had been loaned to the United Nations to become the headquarters of the United Nations Protection Force.

I am pleased to present the latest product from the Stimson Center’s Future of Peace Operations program. This work, by Senior Associate William Durch and Research Associate Tobias Berkman, addresses the supply of peacekeeping forces, in a world where the demand appears to be growing. As we go to print in the summer of 2006, the international community is seized with the question of how to bring stability and peace to the border area between Israel and Lebanon. All the enduring issues are in play there: What are the political prerequisites for a workable stabilization force? Should it be run by the UN or by a group of strong countries willing to use more robust rules of engagement if need be? Which countries, regional organizations, alliances, or international institutions can muster the right forces and the political will to engage? How long will they stay engaged? When they want to leave, to whom will they hand over their tasks? The new Stimson Center study provides important context, history and analysis to address these questions.

The challenges of winning the peace, as well as winning the war, have gained increasing attention among nato members. This development reflects hard-learned lessons from Alliance experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Despite attention at all levels, corresponding changes have yet to be institutionalized within nato. This resistance to change is, in part, normal bureaucratic inertia, but it also reflects a lack of consensus about the extent to which nato should be involved in establishing and sustaining a peace. Differences within the Alliance on appropriate roles for nato beyond winning wars are coming to the surface in the debate over the immediate post-war tasks of stabilisation operations and initial reconstruction efforts, which we refer to in this report by the acronym “S&R”.

The mission was designed to gather information about the human rights situation in Western Sahara and in the refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. The mission was then to report to the High Commissioner about the human rights situation and make recommendations on how to assist the concerned parties to jmprove the promotion and protection of human rights of the people of Western Sahara. With a view to continuing the constructive dialogue with those concerned in implementing the recommendations of this report, this report is not a public report

For the past decade, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as we came to know it during the Cold War, has been transformed beyond recognition. Yet, many fear that the Alliance itself has gone astray. In Europe and in the United States citizens are ambivalent about the Alliance because they neglect what it has achieved, question what it now does, and differ over what they want out of it next.

Before I begin my remarks on NATO’s current operations in Afghanistan, I would like to highlight several major operations in which the Alliance is currently involved and in doing so, provide you with the strategic context and background against which all of our efforts in Afghanistan are balanced. Today the Alliance is engaged with some 38,000 troops deployed in missions and operations on three continents.

Le mouvement des Non-alignés (en anglais, Non-Aligned Movement) est une organisation internationale regroupant plus de 100 États (114 en 2006), qui se définissent comme des pays n´étant alignés avec, ou contre, aucune grande puissance mondiale. La Déclaration de Brioni du 19 juillet 1956, initiée par Gamal Abdel Nasser, Josip Broz Tito et Jawaharlal Nehru, marque l´origine du mouvement, qui vise à se protéger de l´influence des États-Unis et de l´URSS qui cherchaient à polariser le monde en leur faveur.

The Security Council,Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001, 1413 (2002) of 23 May 2002, 1444(2002) of 27 November 2002, 1510 (2003) of 13 October 2003, 1563 (2004) of 17 September 2004, 1623 (2005) of 13 September 2005 and 1659 (2006) of 15 February 2006.

According to reports, the United Nations is on course to select its next Secretary-General in October. The process gained steam this week with an informal straw poll in the Security Council. The details of the “blind” straw poll reveal very little about how much support each of the current candidates really have. Instead, it was merely a way for candidates to learn which of the 15 Security Council members “encourage” them to go on, “discourage” them, or have “no opinion.”

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization took command of operations in southern Afghanistan where the U.S.-led coalition and Afghan army are facing a resurgence of violence by the Taliban.

Recalling also its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict, and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms inter alia the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit outcome document, as well as the report of its Mission to the Sudan and Chad from 4 to 10 June 2006.

With little fanfare—and even less notice—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has gone global. Created to protect postwar Western Europe from the Soviet Union, the alliance is now seeking to bring stability to other parts of the world. In the process, it is extending both its geographic reach and the range of its operations. In recent years, it has played peacekeeper in Afghanistan, trained security forces in Iraq, and given logistical support to the African Union’s mission in Darfur. It assisted the tsunami relief eªort in Indonesia and ferried supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and to those of a massive earthquake in Pakistan.

The other day in Rome, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held her ground. Bravo, Condi. Her counterparts in the "international community" wanted to prevail upon her to join with them in an agreement calling upon Israel to desist from trying to extirpate from southern Lebanon Hezbollah launch sites used for the missiles that have been raining down on Northern Israel -- unprovoked.

The other day in Rome, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held her ground. Bravo, Condi. Her counterparts in the "international community" wanted to prevail upon her to join with them in an agreement calling upon Israel to desist from trying to extirpate from southern Lebanon Hezbollah launch sites used for the missiles that have been raining down on Northern Israel -- unprovoked.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo will hold its first legitimate elections in four decades on Sunday. The United Nations peacekeeping mission there has played the role of electoral midwife, so if the vote is free and fair it will be among the global body’s greatest successes on the continent.

The U.S. military has handed over military duties in Afghanistan's unruly southern provinces to NATO, whose forces had previously been deployed only to relatively peaceful regions in the north and around the capital, Kabul. The gravity of the handover became immediately apparent, with four NATO soldiers killed and a number wounded in a series of attacks by Taliban fighters soon after the alliance assumed responsibility for security in the south (AP). Still, the increase in NATO troop strength will allow the U.S. military to shift more of its forces to the violence-plagued Afghan-Pakistani border region, as this new Backgrounder explains.

It's not Israeli Prime Minister Olmert who should be apologizing to Kofi Annan for the death of four UN observers in Lebanon--if indeed it was the IDF that killed them--but Annan who should be apologizing to Olmert and to the Lebanese people. For years, UN observers have watched the build-up of Hizbullah’s armory and the construction of its fortified tunnels and its bunkers in the hills overlooking Israel and they have done nothing. The UN has allowed Hizbullah to move rockets into homes, schools and mosques, in the midst of heavily populated towns, and they have done nothing. The UN observers have watched Hizbullah terrorists train and be trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guards on their doorstep and they have done nothing.

The Security Council, seriously concerned that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was still unable to provide assurances about Iran’s undeclared nuclear material and activities after more than three years, today demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and gave it one month to do so or face the possibility of economic and diplomatic sanctions to give effect to its decision.

Reafirma su llamamiento para que se respete estrictamente en todo el Líbano la soberanía, la integridad territorial, la unidad y la independencia política del Líbano bajo la autoridad única y exclusiva del Gobierno del Líbano.

The old UN Human Rights Commission was a body so biased and farcical that it was disbanded last year. The commission met once annually for a six-week session in Geneva, formally devoting one week of each session to condemnations of Israel along with much additional bashing of the Jewish state. Despite protests, the commission’s 2003 session was chaired by a paladin of human rights known as Libya.

Sixty years ago, the United Nations was founded to maintain international peace and security, promote self-determination and basic human rights, and protect fundamental freedoms. Sadly, weaknesses in the organization have prevented it from fully realizing these high aspirations.

El papel de la ONU debe ser potenciado, pero es imposible desconocer sus recientes fracasos como mediadora en los conflictos, la farsa que encierra la vigencia del derecho de veto en el Consejo de Seguridad, la asimetría interna y externa de los regímenes y Gobiernos allí representados, y la predominancia en su seno de los comportamientos burocráticos.

In the next month the United Nations, still tottering after its annus scandalis, faces two consequential decisions that will test the organization’s ability to implement its founding purpose to protect human rights and international peace.

The idea is as logical as it is radical: The notion of Israeli membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is bubbling to the surface after recent events that have crystallized the threats to Israel and how common they are to the dangers confronting the U.S. and Europe.

The U.S. and EU should also withhold all funding from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and call for an immediate inquiry into how it has been spending donors’ money as well as allegations that it has hired members of terrorist organizations and stoked anti-Semitism among Palestinian refugees.

Which is all the more reason for the U.S. to promote a more serious diplomatic response suggested to us last week over lunch at the Journal by former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar: Begin NATO accession talks with Israel.

The Human Rights Watch World Report 2006 contains information on human rights developments in more than 60 countries in 2005.

The final substantive report concerning the UN Oil-for-Food Programme. This report illustrates the manner in which Iraq manipulated the Programme to dispense contracts on the basis of political preferece and to derive illicit payments from companies that obtained oil and humanitarian goods contracts.

The Security Council, by its resolution 1595 of 7 April 2005, decided to establish an international independent investigation Commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of the terrorist attack which took place on 14 February 2005 in Beirut that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.

The flagship of a transformed Alliance is the NATO Response Force – and it must be deployable, modern, and responsive. A strong and effective NRF will give this Alliance the capability and flexibility it needs to meet threats wherever and whenever they arise.

Last week, world leaders met for what Kofi Annan described as a "once-in-a-generation opportunity to take bold decisions in the areas of development, security, human rights and reform of the United Nations." But a reading of the "outcome document" world leaders are signing shows it to be yet another missed opportunity for U.N. reform. John Bolton pushed hard to improbé the document and succeeded in modifying its most objectionable clauses.

Independent Inquiry Committee finds mismanagement and failure of oversight: Un Member States and Secretariat share responsibility. With respect to the Programme as a whole, the Committee’s central conclusion is that the United Nations requires stronger executive leadership, thoroughgoing administrative reform, and more reliable controls and auditing.

Reviews UN efforts to transform eight unstable countries into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous partners, and compares those missions with U.S. nation-building operations. The UN provides the most suitable institutional framework for nation-building missions that require fewer than 20,000 men — one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy.

En septiembre de 2005, los dirigentes mundiales celebrarán una cumbre en Nueva York para examinar los progresos realizados desde que se proclamó la Declaración del Milenio, aprobada por todos los Estados Miembros en el año 2000. El informe del Secretario General incluye un proyecto de programa que será examinado en la cumbre con miras a la adopción de medidas. Se trata de decisiones normativas y de reformas que pueden aplicarse si se consigue movilizar la voluntad política necesaria.

Henning Riecke considers the need for change in international organisations, arguing that NATO’s transformation must be based on a firm political foundation.

This Report examines the UN’s 1998 hiring of the Swiss company Cotecna to conduct inspections of humanitarian goods entering Iraq under the Oil-for-Food Program and any potential conflict of interest involving UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, whose son Kojo was employed by Cotecna.

En los próximos 10 años podemos reducir a la mitad la pobreza en el mundo y frenar la difusión de las principales enfermedades conocidas. Podemos reducir la prevalencia de los conflictos violentos y del terrorismo. Podemos prorrogar el respeto de la dignidad humana en todos los países.

These reports are a key part of this Administration's activities to promote human rights and democracy around the world, part of President Bush's forward strategy of freedom.

Overview of investigative results and sets out the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Food Programme.